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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mr. Dobbs appeals from his judgment of conviction, challenging his sentence as an abuse
of discretion. He argued in his Appellant’s Brief that the district court abused its discretion when
it fashioned his sentence, in part, based on a desire to “deter[ ] private vengeance.” (Appellant’s
Br., pp.4-6.) In its Respondent’s Brief, the State argues, among other things, that any error on the
part of the district court “was clearly harmless” because the sentence would have been the same
absent the error. (Respondent’s Br., p.8.) Mr. Dobbs submits this Reply Brief primarily to
address the State’s harmless error argument. Because it is not clear beyond a reasonable doubt
that the district court would have imposed the same sentence on Mr. Dobbs absent its stated
desire to deter private vengeance, this Court should vacate Mr. Dobbs’ sentence and remand this
case to the district court for a new sentencing hearing.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Dobbs included a statement of facts and course of proceedings in his Appellant’s
Brief, which he relies on and incorporates herein. (See Appellant’s Br., pp.1-2.)

1

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion at sentencing?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion At Sentencing
Mr. Dobbs argued in his Appellant’s Brief that the district court did not act within the
boundaries of its discretion when it fashioned his sentence, in part, based on a desire to “deter[ ]
private vengeance.” (Appellant’s Br., pp.4-6.) At Mr. Dobbs’ sentencing hearing, the district
court described the punishment sentencing factor as follows:
The next factor is punishment. And punishment in this sense, in the sense of a
child sex crime, often can be explained by saying it deters private vengeance. And
so the child that you had sex with there may be [a] relative or friend of hers who
thinks, well, the sentence imposed was not sufficiently serious, and so I need to
take the law into my own hands. So it is—it’s not the primary factor in
sentencing, but it’s a legitimate sentencing factor for a court to consider. The
sentence must send a message to others in society that there is really no need for
anyone to take the law into his or her own hands.
(Tr., p.64, L.17 – p.65, L.3.) The State argues the district court did not abuse its discretion in
considering deterrence of private vengeance because the court’s explanation was consistent with
the dictionary definition of “punishment” and “vengeance.” (Respondent’s Br., pp.7-8.) The
State’s analysis does not go far enough.
Our Supreme Court has previously explained that trial courts are not required to use any
specific words in articulating the objectives of criminal punishment. See State v. Wersland, 125
Idaho 499, 503 (1994). However, the words used by a trial court must express the proper
objectives of criminal punishment. See id. Thus, the Wersland Court held the trial court did not
abuse its discretion when it used the words “vindicating the victim” and “imposing just moral
blame” as alternative ways of stating the fourth objective of criminal punishment, which is
“punishment or retribution for wrongdoing.” Id. Here, by contrast, the words used by the district
court (“deter[ ] private vengeance”) are not an alternative way of stating “punishment or
retribution for wrongdoing.” The concepts of punishment and retribution do not encompass the
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deterrence of private vengeance. The district court explained to Mr. Dobbs that, in fashioning his
sentence for a child sex crime, it could legitimately consider deterring a relative or friend of the
victim from taking the law into his own hands if he believed the sentence imposed was not
sufficiently serious. This does not fall within the objective of “punishment or retribution for
wrongdoing.”
The State also argues that any error on the part of the district court “was clearly
harmless” because the sentence would have been the same absent the error. (Respondent’s
Br., p.8.) As a general rule, when a discretionary ruling has been tainted by error, this Court will
vacate the trial court’s decision and remand the matter for a new, error-free, discretionary
determination. See State v. Medrain, 143 Idaho 329, 333 (Ct. App. 2006). If, however, this Court
is “convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt” that the error did not affect the sentence imposed,
then remand is not necessary. See id. This Court cannot be convinced, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the district court’s error in describing the objectives of sentencing did not affect the
sentence it imposed on Mr. Dobbs.
The sentence the district court imposed (22 years, with 10 years fixed) was greater than
the sentence recommended by the prosecutor (20 years, with 8 years fixed) and by counsel for
Mr. Dobbs (7 years, with 2 years fixed). (Tr., p.38, L.25 – p.39, L.2, p.47, Ls.10-15; R., pp.51,
53, 56.) The district court expressed particular concern with deterring private vengeance in child
sex cases, which this case was. While the district court said deterrence of private vengeance was
“not the primary factor,” it did describe it as “a legitimate sentencing factor.” (Tr., p.64, L.17 –
p.65, L.3.) The district court never said it would impose the same sentence on Mr. Dobbs absent
consideration of, in the district court’s view, the legitimate sentencing factor of deterring private
vengeance. On the record presented, remand for a new sentencing hearing is necessary.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, as well as those set forth in his Appellant’s Brief,
Mr. Dobbs respectfully requests that this Court vacate his sentence and remand this case to the
district court for a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 29th day of May, 2019.

/s/ Andrea W. Reynolds
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 29th day of May, 2019, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Kylie M. Fourtner
KYLIE M. FOURTNER
Administrative Assistant
AWR/kmf

5

